中国《公司法》及《公司法解释(四)》对股东“不正当目的”规制,不 论是从“股东自营与公司主营业务具有实质竞业关系的公司”这一外观,还 是从股东“为了向他人通报信息”这一内心意思,抑或是从股东“三年内曾 向他人通报信息”这一行为角度,理论上均无法证成对股东查阅公司会计 账簿和会计凭证的权利予以限制的正当性. 有必要放宽对股东“不正当目 的”的规制,借鉴日本《公司法》第358条的股东通过非讼程序请求法院 “选任检查人”的制度,并辅之以美国《示范商业公司法》第16.02条的公 司与股东之间签订保密合同的制度,由法院判定保密合同中规定的违反 保密义务的责任金额是否合理,立体规制股东查阅公司会计账簿和会计 凭证时可能侵害公司商业秘密的情况.
China’s “Company Law” and “Company Law Interpretation (4)” regulate shareholders’ “improper purposes”, whether from the appearance of “a company that is self-operated by shareholders and has a substantial competitive relationship with the company’s main business”, or from the perspective of shareholders, whose inner meaning is “to inform the information to other persons”, or the shareholder’s previous behavior of “notifying information to other persons within three years”, cannot theoretically justify the restriction of shareholders’ legitimate rights to inspect the company’s accounting books and accounting vouchers. It is necessary to relax regulations on shareholders’ “unfair purposes”. Learn from the Article No. 358 of Japan’s “Company Law”, which allows shareholders to request the court to select an inspector“ through non-litigation procedures, and refer the Article No. 16.02 of the U.S. ”Model Company Law“ concerning the rule of confidential contract signed between a company and its shareholders and the court will be required to determine whether the amount of liability reasonable for breach of confidentiality obligations stipulated in this confidentiality contract, in order to three- dimensionally regulate situations in which shareholders may infringe on the company’s trade secrets when they review the company’s accounting books and accounting vouchers.