Team Approaches for Agricultural Nonpoint Source Water Pollution Control
- Resource Type
- Conference
- Authors
- Zou, Jiliang; Yuan, Yongkang
- Source
- 2009 International Conference on Management and Service Science Management and Service Science, 2009. MASS '09. International Conference on. :1-4 Sep, 2009
- Subject
- Engineering Profession
General Topics for Engineers
Water pollution
Water resources
Instruments
Environmentally friendly manufacturing techniques
Industrial pollution
Government
Command and control systems
Pollution control
Costs
Quality management
- Language
Nonpoint source water pollution, primarily from agricultural sources, is a major cause of water quality impairment. Uncertainty and asymmetric information are the key regulatory difficulties in the control of agricultural NPSP. The main target of this study is to describe a potential incentive scheme that can be applied in limited information situations. Team contracts built upon principal-agent theory are proposed. To handle the incentive problems typical in many principal agent problems, it incorporates peer monitoring to induce the nonpoint sources water pollution to meet their contractual obligations.