Single Trace Electromagnetic Side-Channel Attacks on FPGA Implementation of Elliptic Curve Cryptography
- Resource Type
- Conference
- Authors
- Ravi, Prasanna; Jungk, Bernhard; Bhasin, Shivam
- Source
- 2019 Joint International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, Sapporo and Asia-Pacific International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC Sapporo/APEMC) Electromagnetic Compatibility, Sapporo and Asia-Pacific International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC Sapporo/APEMC), 2019 Joint International Symposium on. :1-4 Jun, 2019
- Subject
- Aerospace
Bioengineering
Communication, Networking and Broadcast Technologies
Components, Circuits, Devices and Systems
Computing and Processing
Engineered Materials, Dielectrics and Plasmas
Engineering Profession
Fields, Waves and Electromagnetics
General Topics for Engineers
Photonics and Electrooptics
Power, Energy and Industry Applications
Robotics and Control Systems
Signal Processing and Analysis
Transportation
Feature extraction
Registers
Probes
Elliptic curve cryptography
Field programmable gate arrays
Clustering algorithms
Standards
- Language
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is one of the commonly used public key cryptosystems. In this paper, we propose a generic single trace attack on ECC implementations which exploits the EM leakage of secret scalar bits. The proposed attack works in a black-box setting. Practical EM side channel attacks are demonstrated on unprotected and protected (point re-randomisation, scalar blinding) FPGA of the scalar multiplication over Twisted Edwards curve with success rate of about 99%. The attack setting directly applies to ECC based key agreement (ECDHE) and signatures (ECDSA) schemes with ephemeral secrets.