Hardware Trojan Insertion and Detection in Asynchronous Circuits
- Resource Type
- Conference
- Authors
- Inaba, Koutaro; Yoneda, Tomohiro; Kanamoto, Toshiki; Kurokawa, Atsushi; Imai, Masashi
- Source
- 2019 25th IEEE International Symposium on Asynchronous Circuits and Systems (ASYNC) ASYNC Asynchronous Circuits and Systems (ASYNC), 2019 25th IEEE International Symposium on. :134-143 May, 2019
- Subject
- Aerospace
Bioengineering
Communication, Networking and Broadcast Technologies
Components, Circuits, Devices and Systems
Computing and Processing
Engineered Materials, Dielectrics and Plasmas
Engineering Profession
Fields, Waves and Electromagnetics
General Topics for Engineers
Photonics and Electrooptics
Power, Energy and Industry Applications
Robotics and Control Systems
Signal Processing and Analysis
Transportation
Trojan horses
Hardware
Asynchronous circuits
Pipelines
Routing
Latches
Delays
asynchronous circuit
hardware Trojan
deep learning
neural network
random forest
- Language
- ISSN
- 2643-1483
Hardware Trojan threats caused by malicious designers and untrusted manufacturers have become one of serious issues in modern VLSI systems. In this paper, we show some experimental results to insert hardware Trojans into asynchronous circuits. As a result, the overhead of hardware Trojan insertion in asynchronous circuits may be small for malicious designers who have enough knowledge about the asynchronous circuits. In addition, we also show several Trojan detection methods using deep learning schemes which have been proposed to detect synchronous hardware Trojan in the netlist level. We apply them to asynchronous hardware Trojan circuits and show their results. They have a great potential to detect a hardware Trojan in asynchronous circuits.