The losses from integration in matching markets can be large
- Resource Type
- Authors
- Josue Ortega
- Source
- Economics Letters. 174:48-51
- Subject
- Economics and Econometrics
Matching (statistics)
Computer science
05 social sciences
Rank (computer programming)
FOS: Economics and business
Social integration
0502 economics and business
Economics - Theoretical Economics
Econometrics
Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)
050207 economics
Preference list
Finance
050205 econometrics
- Language
- ISSN
- 0165-1765
Although the integration of two-sided matching markets using stable mechanisms generates expected gains from integration, I show that there are worst case scenarios in which these are negative. The losses from integration can be large enough that the average rank of an agent’s spouse decreases by 37.5% of the length of their preference list in any stable matching mechanism.