The framing effect occurs when different presentations of the same problem lead to predictably different preferences. The dual-process framework of higher cognition assumes that the effect violates rational principles, but alternative accounts and recent evidence have contested this interpretation. Contributing to this debate, we will test the dual-process assumption by investigating associations between susceptibility to framing and the willingness and ability to think in line with rational norms, conceptualized as actively open-minded thinking and pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity, or the tendency to uncritically accept meaningless statements as profound. We will conduct a dual-site online study in North America and Bulgaria (N = 250 per site) and administer several framing problems within subjects, presumably a necessary condition for the associations to appear. To test our hypotheses, we will use confirmatory factor analyses. Our findings might bear important implications for both the dual-process account of framing and the practice of administering framing tasks to test rational thought. Our study further contributes to adapting existing measures to a novel setting and expanding the findings across borders and populations.