Summary: The Communist victory in the Third Revolutionary Chinese Civil War has been largely thought of as inevitable, and thus the war itself has not been studied in great detail. This is especially true regarding the Communist side. For this reason, this dissertation focuses on two key areas, CCP strategy formulation and implementation, and the development of the Communist hierarchy. The intent is to establish contingency in the war, illustrate how the war affected the CCP leadership in anticipation of the PRC era and connect CCP strategy with the larger question of strategic culture. The main evidence for this study is drawn from recently-published records in the PRC and recently-opened archives. Consequently, much of this material has never been seen before in the West, nor has it been translated into English. From this data, one can see that the result of the war was not inevitable; Communist strategy was not monolithic; the CCP hierarchy was forged during the war (i.e., reputations made or broken) rather than before it; and that strategy on the Communist side reflected an amalgamation of Western and Chinese ideas.