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학위논문 동서

退溪와 栗谷의 心性設 比較硏究

김성범

부산: 동아대학교 1994. -

200p; 27cm. -

학위논문(박사)- 동아대학교 대학원 철학과 `95년2월

영문초록 : The purpose of this dissertation is to examine how Toegye and Yulgok, the two representative Neo-Confucians in Korea, differ from each other in their approach to the concept of human nature. For such Neo-Confucians as Toegye(退溪) and Yulgok(栗谷), the nature of man should be explained in terms of the three elements, i.e., mind(心,SHIM), reason(性,SUNG) and emotion(情,JUNG). These three in turn constitute the essence of human being as a moral agent. This means that various views and discussions in Neo-Confucianism in a nutshell are directed to the studv of man from a moral point of view, Particularly it means that Li(理) and Gi(氣), the basis for the various Neo-Confucian issues, should be understood in the context moral anthropology. There have been numerous studies on Toegye and Yulgok, and this tendency shows no sign of decrease. However there are only a few comparative studies on them, considering their conspicuos position in the Neo-Confucian tradition. Besides the few studies appear to have some serious problems. For example, we can find a problem in Tsai Maosung's 『A Comparative Study of Toegye and Yulgok Philosophy』, in which he argues that Li in YLllgok's philosophy has a control over Gi, and that Yulgok is a true successor of Zhu-Zi, and that Toegye does not accept the Zhu-Zi's position. Nevertheless he argues that in Yulgok's view Ll and Gi are inseparable entities from the beginning, and therefore Li has only a nominal characteristic, not a real, ontological status. Tsai Maosung's view is not convincing because of its incoherence. According to Zhu-Zi and Toegye, Li and Gi are not separable from each other. But either from the aspect of the phenpmenal world, or from the aspect of principle, Li is the regulator and Gi the regulated. When the origin is pursued from the viewpont of "understanding things on the basis of principle", the fact that Li is prior to Gi is inevitable. This is why Zhu-Zi and Toegye are said to be the advocates of the primacy of Li(JU-Ll-LON,主理論). In the contrast, Yulgok maintains that Li and Gi are inseperable entities, and that Li is "the oder of its own entity Gi." Li, therefore, does not play on active role in its relation to Gi; rather, Li is dependent on Gi. This is the reason for arguing that Yulgok is advocates the primacy of Gi(JU-Gl-LON,主氣論). The basic objective of Neo-Confucian world-view is establish a moral perspective on human being. Both JU-Ll-LON and JU-Gl-LON have this objective in common. It is natural that the difference in their approach to the relation between Ll and Gi makes a difference in their perspective on human being. Toegye argues for the priority of Li to Gi. But both Ju-Ll-LON and JU-Gl-LON postulated that Li and Gi always existed together in the phenominal world. Zhu-Zi thinks that how Li and Gi are related to each other depends upon whether they appear in the world of phenomena or in the world of principle. He observes that Li and Gi always exist together in phenominal world, but the two do not fuse together into one but remain as independent entities; 『Li as Li and Gi as Gi』,(理自理氣自氣 Ll-JA-Ll, Gl-JA-Gl). At the same time, if we pursue the phenomenal world In its origin, we finally reach the ultimat principle, i.e. Li. Zhu-Zi, therefore, argue that Li has its own unique category as a transcendenal principle. In other words, before the presence of the world, Li have had its being already. By interpreting Zhu-ryumgye's remark, "Absence of Polarity is the Great Category of Polarity" in terms of I-chun's "Dualism of Principle(道 D0) and Container(器 Gl)," he regared the category of Li as the transcendental category of principle. Toegye follows Zhu-Zi's in this regard. In contrast, Yulgok interprets "Absence of Polarity is the Great Category of Polarity" in terms of the "Monism of Li and Gi". As a result he regards the category of Li as a mere nominal entity. For him Li and Gi are inseperable from the beginning. The active source of Gi, the directive capacitlr clf Gi is not sought outside Gi itself. It is followed that Li is nothing but the self-oder of Gi. Li is embodied in Gi. Li dose not have an operative function as Toegye observe. It is clear that Yulgok is the advocate of the primacy of Gi. Different perspectives on the relationship between Li and Gi are well-reflected in the different perspectives on the issues of Mind, Reason, and Emotion. Following Zhu-Zi's position that "analysis is a method to discerning the right from the wrong", Toegye argues that just as we can regard Li and Gi as one and the same unit or as two seperate units, so one can regard Mind, Reason, and Emotion in the same way. In this respect the difference between Nature Mind(道心,DO-SIM) and Physical Mind(人心,IN-SIM), and the defference between Reason Nature(本然性 BON-YUON-SEONG) and Reason Temper(氣質惺,Gl-JIL-SEONG) receive recognition. Emotion also stand on the same ground. Arguing against Toegye, Yulgok consistantly asserts that Gi inc;udes Li, and therefore concludes that Physical Mind includes Nature Mind, and the Temper Reason includ Nature Reason. And with regard to Emotion he says that Four types of Emotion(四端,SA-DAN) include Seven dispositions(七情,CHIL-JUNG). As made clear in the above exposition, the different views of the relationship between Li and Gi brought out the different views of the concept of "Discipline" and human being, i.e. Mind, Reason, and Emotion. For Toegye the purpose of "Discipline" is the restoration of "Bovine Principle"(天理,CHUN-Ll) which is the essential meaning of human being, and this is achieved through "Respect"(敬,KYUNG). Yulgok, on the other hand argues that the original form of Gi should be restored, and the method of "Discipline" is "Sincerity"(誠,SEONG). Sincerity therefore is the method of Transforming Temper(變化氣質, BYUN- WHUA -Gl-JIL) : it is not the method of restoring the "Bovine Principle" Both Toegye and Yulgok have been acknowledged as the leading figures of Neo-Confucianism. Their philosophical tendency, however, showes a great difference from the start. Accordingly such trend among the Neo-Confucian scholars who uncritically classify the two figures into the category of Neo-Confucianism, and, thereby regard their positions as identical, should be avoided. We should also recognize that such contentions as to who is truer follower of Zhu-Zi is meaningless, and that scholarly works on them should go beyond the category of Neo-Confucianism.

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