上市公司破产管理人的选任结果可能会对普通债权人的权益保护产生 影响,先行研究认为,如果政府部门以清算组形式介入并担任破产管理 人,将会损害普通债权人的权益,并造成诸如破产重整价值分配被扭曲、 强制批准制度被滥用等后果,阻碍了重整制度目标的实现. 然而,先行研 究的结论并不符合推断性统计检验的结果. 针对53家上市重整企业的实证 分析结果显示:第一,在已进行重整的上市公司中,采用破产管理人模 式的企业数量和比率均远超于采用经管债务人(DIP)模式的企业. 此 外,大部分企业的管理人由政府部门介入的清算组担任. 第二,政府部门 以清算组的形式担任破产管理人的重整案件,同中介机构担任破产管理 人的重整案件相比,出现出资人权益完全不调整的情况更多. 第三,政府 部门以清算组的形式担任破产管理人的重整案件,同中介机构担任破产 管理人的重整案件相比,适用针对普通债权人的强制批准制度的情况不 一定更频繁. 第四,清政府部门以清算组的形式担任破产管理人的重整案 件,同中介机构担任破产管理人的重整案件相比,从裁定重整至批准重 整计划草案的时间不一定更短,即普通债权人在重整程序中的谈判与沟 通时间不一定更短. 对于以上该结论,未来研究需要查明的是:真正影响 普通债权人的清偿情况、针对普通债权人的强制批准以及普通债权人谈 判和沟通时间的因素究竟是什么?在查明了真正的影响因素后,才能对 症下药,促使重整程序中的普通债权人权益保护情况得到改善.
The administrator’s Selection of the listed company's bankruptcy may affect ordinary creditor's rights and interests, prior researches suggest that if the government department forms a liquidation group and involves in the reorganization as a bankruptcy administrator, the ordinary creditor's rights will be Infringed, the value distribution of bankruptcy reorganization will be distorted and the Cram Down will be abused, it hinders the reorganization system goal’s realization. However, the conclusions of the previous study do not accord with the results of the inferential statistical test. The results of the empirical analysis of 53 restructured enterprises by using inferential statistical test show that: First, among the reorganized listed companies, the number and ratio of enterprises adopting the bankruptcy manager mode are far higher than those adopting the DIP mode. In addition, most of the administrators were liquidation group in which government departments involved. Second, the reorganization cases in which the government departments act as the administrator in the form of the liquidation group, compared with the reorganization cases in which the intermediary institutions act as the insolvency administrator, there are more cases in which the interests of the shareholders are not adjusted at all. Thirdly, compared with the reorganization cases in which the government departments act as the administrator in the form of the liquidation group, the application of the Cram Down for ordinary creditors is not necessarily more frequent. Fourthly, compared with the reorganization cases in which the government departments act as the administrator in the form of the liquidation group, the time period taken by ordinary creditors in the negotiation and communication during the reorganization process is not necessarily shorter. For the above conclusion, future research needs to find out: what are the factors that really affect the repayment situation of ordinary creditors, the Cram Down for ordinary creditors and the length of the period for the ordinary creditors in their negotiation and communication. Only when the real influencing factors are found out can the appropriate measures be taken to improve the protection of ordinary creditors' rights and interests in the reorganization process.