McDowell opposes the view that the intentionality of language and thought remains mysterious unless it can be understood ‘from outside the conceptual order’. While he thinks the demand for such a ‘sideways‐on’ understanding can be the result of ‘scientistic prejudice’, he points to Sellars's thought as exhibiting a different source: a distortion of our perspective ‘from within the conceptual order’. Aacodingly, the distortion involves a failure on Sellars's part to see how descriptions from within the conceptual order can present expressions. In addition, mental acts as related to extra‐conceptual objects, a failure in turn explained by his failure to see how such relations could have normative import. In this paper, I argue that Sellars's thought suffers from no such distortion. ased on my analysi, McDowell's examination of Sellars has not uncovered a disorder whose treatment might help relieve the desire for a sideways‐on view.