This paper re-examines two major concerns about the validity of Pascal's Wager: (1) The classical von Neumann-Morgenstern Theorem seems to contradict the rationality of maximising expected utility when the utility function's range contains infinite numbers (McClennen 1994). (2) Apparently, the utility of salvation cannot be reflexive under addition by real numbers (which some interpretations of Pensées §233 demand) and strictly irreflexive under multiplication by scalars < 1 at the same time (Hájek 2003). Robinsonian nonstandard analysis is used to establish a hyperreal version of the von Neumann-Morgenstern Theorem: an affine utility representation theorem for internal, complete, transitive, independent and infinitesimally continuous preference orderings on lotteries with hyperreal probabilities. (Herein, a preference relation ≼ on lotteries is called infinitesimally continuous if and only if for all x ≺ y ≺ z, there exist hyperreal, possibly infinitesimal, numbers p, q such that the "perturbed preference ordering" px + (1 — p) z ≺ y ≺ qx + (1 — q) z holds. Infinitesimal Continuity is hence a much weaker condition than continuity.) This Hyperreal von Neumann-Morgenstern Theorem yields a hyperreal version of the Expected Utility Theorem — affirming a conjecture by Sobel (1996). This responds to objection (1). To address objection (2), a convex linearly ordered superset S of the reals whose maximum is both reflexive under addition by finite numbers and strictly irreflexive under multiplication by scalars < 1 is constructed. If the Wagerer is indifferent among the pure outcomes except salvation (an orthodox soteriological position) and her preference ordering satisfies certain rationality axioms, then this preference ordering can be represented through an S-valued (not just hyperrealvalued) utility function. This result responds to objections (1) and (2) simultaneously.