This paper studies a two-stage dual-channel supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one traditional retailer. The manufacturer has its own online channel when he sells its product to the offline retailer. There exists a Stackelberg game between the manufacturer and the traditional retailer, in which the manufacturer is the leader and the traditional retailer is the follower. The manufacturer sets the online retail price which is the same as the offline retail price. When the supply chain is in static (undisrupted) scenario, its Pareto improvement can be obtained and it can be coordinated by the two-part-tariff contract with one-time transfer payment. When disruptions make the market scale change, the supply chain performance such as the optimal retail price, the optimal production quantity and the optimal total supply chain profit under different demand disruptions in the centralized supply chain can be obtained. Then, we find that there exists certain robustness in the manufacturer’s production quantity. When the supply chain is decentralized, the supply chain coordination can be obtained by changing the wholesale price and one-time transfer payment according to different disruption levels. Finally, some numerical examples are presented to illustrate the results.