Rapid change is being seen in the electrical grid. Microgrids, renewable energy sources, and the increased automation of grid-level decision-making made possible by sensors have all contributed to the grid's growing complexity. Studies in the field of smart grids have shown the grid's susceptibility to hacking. In example, new research shows how the insertion of erroneous data may cause a wide range of issues in the functioning of smart grids. A sophisticated assault might compromise the power grid's functioning and control without being detected by bad data detection equipment performing state estimation. In this study, we expand upon previous works in the field to detail how safeguarding selected vital sensor in the power system from fake data injection attacks might help mitigate the problem. This article discusses the IEEE 14 bus evaluation system and explains how a fake data injection attack may be carried out given just little information about the network. Different case studies are used to verify the assumptions used to determine the attacking zone. In this study, we see why protecting the electric grid from cyberattacks is so crucial.