在具体的公司治理实践中,董事长与总经理"两职合一"的权力结构安排,究竟是缓解抑或加重了代理问题,学界对此问题的探讨局限于分析"两职合一"与公司绩效的直接关系.而文章作者从管理层权力的角度实证检验了"两职合一"对高管薪酬-业绩敏感性的影响,以此分析"两职合一"的治理效应.研究发现:董事长与总经理"两职合一"的设置并未发挥其真正的治理作用;"两职合一"显著提高了高管薪酬,与此同时显著降低了高管薪酬-业绩敏感性,支持代理理论的观点.上述研究结论在经过区分企业产权性质、区分企业所在行业竞争程度、替换因变量和测试变量、测试变量和控制变量进行滞后一阶处理等一系列稳健性检验后仍然成立.这为"两职合一"治理机制的研究提供了新视角,研究结果丰富了公司治理的相关文献,而且也为实践中的企业如何科学设置高管权力结构提供了理论支持与决策参考.
Whether the arrangement of power structure of CEO Duality is easing the agency problem or aggravating the agency problem in the spe-cific practice of corporate governance is limited to the analysis of the direct relationship between CEO duality and corporate performance in the a-cademic circle. This paper empirically tests the impact of CEO duality on executive compensation-performance sensitivity from the perspective of management power, and then analyzes the governance effect of CEO duality. The results show that: CEO duality cannot play a true role in corporate governance; it can significantly improve the executive compensation while at the same time it can also reduce the executive compensation-perfor-mance sensitivity, which supports agency theory. The above conclusions are still established after a series of robustness tests, such as distinguishing the nature of the property right of enterprises, distinguishing the degree of competition in the industry, replacing the dependent variables and testing variables, processing testing variables and controlling variables with first order lag method. This paper provides a new perspective for the research of CEO duality. The research results can not only enrich the literature of corporate governance, but also provide theoretical support and decision-making reference for enterprises in the practice of how to set up executive power structure scientifically.