Publicising Malfeasance: When the Local Media Structure Facilitates Electoral Accountability in Mexico
- Resource Type
- Authors
- James M. Snyder; Horacio Larreguy; John Marshall
- Source
- The Economic Journal. 130:2291-2327
- Subject
- Structure (mathematical logic)
Economics and Econometrics
Political science
0502 economics and business
05 social sciences
Accountability
050602 political science & public administration
050207 economics
Public administration
0506 political science
- Language
- ISSN
- 1468-0297
0013-0133
Malfeasance in local governments is common in developing democracies. Electoral accountability could mitigate such malfeasance, but may require media market structures that incentivise profit-maximising local media to report on incumbent malfeasance. We test this claim in Mexico, leveraging plausibly exogenous variation in the pre-election release of municipal audits revealing misallocated spending and access to broadcast media. We find that each additional local media station amplifies voter punishment (rewards) of high (zero) malfeasance by up to 1 percentage point. Local media’s accountability-enhancing effects are greater when there are fewer non-local competitors and where local outlets’ audiences principally reside within their municipality.